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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENT 
Yel'tsin increases public activity 
It would be hard to imagine a more "low profile" approach to public governance 
than Boris Yel'tsin's general performance throughout the last several months, so 
it is with great hesitation that one characterizes his recent flurry of activity 
(speeches, tongue-lashings for ministers, and the ceremony surrounding the new 
union with Belarus) as a return to hands-on leadership. As one former 
apparatchik notes, however, it would also be wrong to count him out altogether. 
Sergei Yastrzhembsky (currently a member of the Luzhkov administration) 
recently warned, "those who have crossed him off the list of active politicians are 
mistaken." (Interfax, 0933 GMT, 6 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-006) 
 
APPARAT 
Borodin gains a supervisor 
According to a report from The Moscow Times (13 Jan 99; nexis), President 
Yel'tsin has given the already powerful General Bordyuzha supervisory authority 
over the Kremlin's Business Affairs office. Details on the scope of Bordyuzha's 
oversight of the agency are not yet available, but it is unlikely that longtime 
Economic Manager Pavel Borodin will welcome this development. 
 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Barsukov is back 
General Mikhail Barsukov's renowned "closed-mouth" reaction to his summary 
dismissal in June 96 has finally paid its dividends. In an edict from late 
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December, the president named Barsukov to the Security Council as head of its 
military inspectorate. According to an Interfax report (1716 GMT, 23 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-357), this new inspectorate "controls the operation of the armed 
forces and other troops, military formations and agencies. It also checks on the 
fulfillment of plans for military development and for the creation and production of 
armaments and military equipment and of dual-purpose know-how." 
 
The same report cited Barsukov on his relationship with the president and his 
family: "We are neighbors and maintain good-neighborly relations." It is, for the 
moment, unclear what the status of relations is between Barsukov and SC 
Secretary Bordyuzha. Time will tell. 
 
Yel'tsin also made other appointments to the Security Council at the end of 
December: Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was decreed head of the 
Interdepartmental Commission for International Security under the Security 
Council; and Border Service Chief Konstantin Totski was named head of the 
Interdepartmental Commission on the Border Policy under the Security Council. 
(ITAR-TASS, 2211 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-539) 
 
MVD 
Award follows reprimand 
Despite (or is it because of?) earlier public presidential criticism of his handling of 
crime and Chechen kidnappings, MVD Chief Sergei Stepashin received the 
Order of Valor from President Yel'tsin on 30 December. (ITAR-TASS, 0913 GMT, 
30 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-364) Stepashin had earned the award, according to 
presidential spokesman Yakushkin, for his "great personal contribution to 
strengthening law and order." 
 
FSB 
Spat brewing between procurator and FSB? 
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As 1998 came to an end, the FSB quietly closed its investigation into "extremist" 
comments made at various rallies by well-known, "extreme" nationalist figures. 
The case, which targeted General Albert Makashov, Stanislav Terekhov and 
Viktor Anpilov, among others, stems from their antisemitic remarks, which 
Procurator Skuratov characterizes as "inciting racial hatred." The procurator 
turned the investigation over to the FSB, for possible prosecution under Article 
280 of the Russian Criminal Code. (Interfax, 1815 GMT, 29 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-363) 
 
The General Procurator, however, has deemed the FSB decision to close the 
case as unlawful and has returned the charges to the FSB for another 
investigation. (ITAR-TASS, 1903 GMT, 10 Jan 99; The BBC, 10 Jan 99/nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah Miller 
 
Another pillar in Moscow's multipolar world 
Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov recently concluded an official visit to 
India on 22 December. While in India Primakov met with the Indian prime 
minister as well as the president, vice president and other high-ranking officials. 
During Primakov's visit a number of bilateral documents were signed concerning 
legal and criminal issues; the development of commercial, economic, industrial, 
financial, scientific and technical cooperation; a consular convention and an 
agreement on the implementation of a program for cooperation in military 
technology until 2010. 
 
The Indian government described Primakov's visit to India and the talks that he 
held as warm, friendly and traditional to Russian-Indian contacts. According to an 
Indian government statement, "both sides express their satisfaction that Russian-
Indian cooperation is developing successfully in all areas [and] agree to map out 
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new ways for the joint use of the enormous potential which exists in Russia and 
India." This same press release indicated that Russia and India planned to work 
actively toward a strategic partnership that would be the cornerstone of Russian-
Indian relations well into the 21st century. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0941 
GMT, 22 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-356) 
 
India, a longtime benefactor of Soviet military hardware and technology as well 
as financial assistance, has continuously worked to improve its relationship with 
the Russian Federation following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The strength 
of this partnership was revealed when Russia, although denouncing India's 
nuclear test, refused to support sanctions directed against India. A Russian-
Indian summit planned for 1999 will only further strengthen this relationship and 
may result in a more formal relationship as well as Russian sponsorship for an 
Indian seat on a Russian-led initiative to expand the UN Security Council. 
 
Moscow blasts Butler...calls for UNSCOM reform 
Moscow's diplomatic maneuvers following US-led strikes against Iraq ranged 
from benign to boisterous, but little if any carried any real punch with the possible 
exception of the latest attacks against the United Nations Special Commission 
and its chairman, Richard Butler. Although it appears unlikely that Iraq will agree 
to UNSCOM resuming its work anytime soon, Russia's Ambassador at the United 
Nations Sergei Lavrov has begun a campaign to ensure any new UN mission in 
Iraq is not led by Butler. Lavrov stated that "the publication of the UNSCOM 
report that was used as a pretext for carrying out attacks against Iraq in 
December was an act of provocation. It contained inaccuracies, half-truths, and 
open lies." As a result, Lavrov added, Russia can "no longer trust UNSCOM 
Chairman Richard Butler." (Radio Rossii Network, 1900 GMT, 7 Jan 99; FBIS-
SOV-99-007) 
 
Lavrov's attacks on UNSCOM and Richard Butler may constitute the first step in 
attempts to create a new version of UNSCOM with an even greater Russian 
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presence, as well as a reduced US and British presence, in Iraq. This process 
was formally initiated in Moscow nearly simultaneously with Lavrov's statements. 
Moscow's support for Iraqi initiatives to replace US and British citizens 
implementing the UN humanitarian program in Iraq with citizens from other 
countries (Interfax, 1202 GMT, 6 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-006) may be the first 
move in Moscow's campaign to eliminate US presence on any UN team in Iraq. 
 
Russia and Iran continue to defend 'peaceful' cooperation 
In what has become an expected event, both the Russian foreign ministry and 
official Iranian sources spent the end of 1998 defending the Iranian nuclear 
program and denying allegations of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and missile technology. In an 11 December statement issued partly in 
response to a New York Times article on Iran's biological warfare program, 
Vladimir Rakhmanin, a spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry, said that 
Moscow has taken note of Western media reports of Iran's attempts to hire 
Russian researchers for the development of biological weapons. He repeated 
that Russia "has been and will continue to abide by international standards for 
weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems." (Interfax, 1224 
GMT, 11 Dec 98; FBIS-TAC-98-345) The following day the Iranian media issued 
similar statements deriding the US policy toward Iran and its relationship with 
Russia. The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the US is 
attempting, within the framework of its defeated policy on isolating Iran, to 
undermine Iran's relations with other countries, including Russia. (Voice of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 1100 GMT, 12 Dec 98; FBIS-NES-98-346) A week later 
Iranian Foreign Minister Dr. Kamal Kharrazi emphasized that the nuclear plant 
Iran is building with the cooperation of Russia is for peaceful purposes. Kharrazi 
added that the construction of the nuclear power plant of Bushehr in southern 
Iran is being supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
(IRNA, 1051 GMT, 22 Dec 98; FBIS-NES-98-356) 
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Moscow's and Tehran's insistence that the Bushehr facility in southern Iran is 
intended solely for peaceful purposes has become a weekly event that has 
served the Primakov government well as a tool to demonstrate Russian support 
for the emerging Iranian-Russian partnership. As long as the IAEA, even though 
it has a questionable track record, continues to supervise the project, Iran and 
Russia can deny allegations and gain international support for the program. 
 
Russia questions CFE treaty, may not 'stick to every letter' 
Russia has recently called on NATO to renegotiate the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) prior to the planned NATO expansion this year or 
face possible Russian noncompliance with the CFE treaty. In a special 
declaration to the press the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed to the 
need to complete negotiations on amending the CFE prior to the formal 
expansion of NATO. That treaty, signed in 1990 by NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries, established permissible ceilings on conventional weapons for the 
member countries of both military-political blocs. (Interfax, 0855 GMT, 2 Jan 99; 
FBIS-TAC-99-002) Following the autumn session of talks on the adaptation of 
the CFE Treaty in Oslo, Moscow stated that decisive progress on several 
outstanding inspection and verification issues must be reached before new 
members are officially admitted to NATO. Moscow is concerned that new NATO 
countries are not covered under the current CFE inspection guidelines. (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 0753 GMT, 2 Jan 99; FBIS-TAC-99-002) 
 
Russia has emphasized that it may not comply with the current version of the 
CFE. A foreign ministry statement issued in early January stated that Russia 
cannot be expected to "stick to every letter of the document [if] Russia's right to 
carry out inspections on the territory of new NATO member states as fully as on 
the territory of the present NATO countries will be infringed on." (Interfax, 0855 
GMT, 2 Jan 99; FBIS-TAC-99-002) 
 
Reports of Russo-Japanese 'interim treaty' firmly rejected 
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Just two months after Russian President Boris Yel'tsin and Japanese Prime 
Minister Keizo Obuchi signed the Moscow Declaration (see Editorial Digest, 4 
Nov 98), the roar of the territorial issue has resurfaced. An article in the 
Japanese newspaper Yomiuri has sparked fierce rejections from both the 
Russian and Japanese governments. According to the article, there exists a 
secret "interim treaty" that would return two of the Kurile islands to Japanese 
control prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 
7 Jan 99) Until the November Moscow summit, Japan had been unwilling to 
negotiate a peace treaty independent of the Kurile Islands issue. While the 
Moscow Declaration represented little forward movement on the territorial issue, 
it seemed to indicate Japan's willingness to negotiate the peace treaty and 
territorial issue in separate fora. (ITAR-TASS, 0851 GMT, 9 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-343) Domestically, the postponement of a firm decision on the fate of the 
islands has fueled dissent in the Far East regions of Russia. The Sakhalin Duma 
has opposed the creation of a territorial subcommittee, saying that it "puts in 
question the territorial integrity and the state sovereignty of the Russian 
Federation." (Interfax, 1257 GMT, 3 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-337) Despite the 
distrust voiced in Yomiuri and the regions, cooperation efforts appear unaffected. 
The first of several working meetings between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Grigori Karasin and his Japanese counterpart, Minoru Tamba, have proceeded 
as scheduled. Furthermore, former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais 
has secured permission from Prime Minister Obuchi to commence the YeES 
Rossii (Unified Energy Systems of Russia) project to supply electrical energy to 
the northern portion of Japan. (ITAR-TASS, 2155 GMT, 2 Dec 98; FIBS-SOV-98-
337) 
 
'Strategic triangle' or security blanket? 
Following a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee, Russian Prime 
Minister Yevgeni Primakov advocated the formation of a "strategic triangle" 
consisting of Russia, India and China. (Deccan Herald, 22 Dec 98; FBIS-NES-
908-356) While Primakov did not elaborate on the comment, Russian Defense 
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Minister Igor Sergeev explained that the triangle would be a security and stability 
arrangement, not a "a military bloc." (Interfax, 1824 GMT, 21 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-355) Although Sino-Russian relations benefited from the recent Moscow 
summit and a common stand against the US-UK bombing of Iraq, Indian-Chinese 
relations have some distance to cover before relations are fully normalized. 
(Xinhua, 1530 GMT, 19 Dec 98; FBIS-CHI-98-353) 
 
Mutual assistance permanently excluded 
During the most recent Pyongyang-Moscow friendship treaty negotiations, 
automatic military involvement was officially scrapped. The newest version of the 
treaty will replace the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance that was discarded in 1996. Under the old treaty, each side was 
required to assist the other in the event of a military conflict. (Yonhap, 0437 GMT, 
22 Dec 98; FBIS-EAS-98-356) In response to questions about the new treaty, 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin said that neither side has "any 
special reasons to be in a hurry to conclude the treaty," but that the Russian 
government wishes to "compile a contemporary universal document that would 
be [operational] for 20-30 years." (ITAR-TASS, 1357 GMT, 2 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-336) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman  
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Ex-communist admits to 'cash for votes' practice in the State Duma 
Duma Deputy and ex-CPRF member Vasily Kobylkin admitted that he was 
offered $10,000 to vote for Chernomyrdin, and another $10,000 for Kirienko. 
According to Kobylkin, the Communists were seriously worried that the Duma 
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would be dissolved as a result of the third rejection of either candidate, and thus 
sought to insure members' cooperation through financial compensation. Kobylkin 
noted that as "[s]urprising as it may seem, deputies discussed the amounts in a 
completely relaxed manner in elevators, corridors, and offices."  
 
The practice of "compensating" Duma members for their votes is, according to 
Kobylkin, widespread. For instance, should a Duma member succeed in bringing 
federal funds home, the region's governor may be expected to provide that 
deputy with a "commission" for his or her efforts. Even more brazen, a deputy 
may approach another deputy and announce a price for support of a given bill or 
amendment. Not all support need be purchased in cash. Foreign vacations or 
promises to aid in the resolution of personal or professional problems may be 
requested. Kobylkin notes that budget negotiations are particularly lucrative. 
 
"It is political naivete to think that the Communists of old were bribe takers and 
the current ones are honest people. The difference is only that then [communists] 
did it secretly while now they do it openly," said Kobylkin. (Komsomol'skaya 
pravda, 1 Dec 98, pp. 1-2; FBIS-SOV-98-335) 
 
REGIONS 
Heads of regional legislatures set up joint body with Federation Council 
A Union of Legislators of Russia was registered in December with the Ministry of 
Justice. The organization brings together members of the Federation Council and 
leaders of the regions' legislatures. Leon Kovalsky, head of the Samara Regional 
Duma, was elected chairman of the presidium of the union. Kovalsky said that 
the aim of the new union is to strengthen the legal base and coordinate 
legislators' efforts in drafting regional legislation. Currently, 53 regions are 
members of the union, but it is expected that the membership will surpass 70 by 
the end of January. The association will hold its first conference in January. 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 1130 GMT, 3 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-337) 
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Considering that the Federation Council is itself populated by the governors and 
the heads of legislatures of the 89 regions, it is not immediately clear what 
purpose the new union shall serve. What is interesting is that the new Union of 
Legislators of Russia is another example of the contemporary Russian penchant 
for inventing institutions in the hope that "this one" will make a difference. But 
such institution-making may not be too surprising as Russians seek to organize 
themselves in the face of change without strong leadership. Who knows, one of 
these institutions may indeed turn out to be extremely important one day. 
 
Where, oh where, have the regions' wages gone? 
Again exposing the growing inability of the federal authorities to lead the country, 
the finance ministry is asking 17 regions where the money earmarked for the 
payment of wages for teachers, doctors, and cultural workers has gone. Federal 
funds sent to pay current wages have not been disbursed by 17 regions 
(including Adygeya, Buryatia, Altay Kray, Magadan Oblast, Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug, Koryak Autonomous Okrug, Kemerovo Oblast, Arkhangelsk 
Oblast). (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10 Dec 98, p. 1; FBIS-SOV-98-344) 
 
To some degree it must be expected that, with the abrogation of federal 
leadership, the regions have established their own priorities and will spend 
federal funds received as they see fit, regardless of the initial conditions upon 
which such grants are dispensed by the center. There is simply no effective way 
to bring the regions to heel; Moscow will have to keep this in mind when 
negotiating countrywide solutions to problems. It is very important to include the 
interests of the regions in the list of considerations when drafting national policy. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Court permits three-time submission of same candidate 
Ruling on Article 111 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court agreed with the 
president that he may submit the same prime ministerial nominee to the State 
Duma for approval three consecutive times. The issue became contentious when 
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President Yel'tsin submitted Sergei Kirienko's name to the Duma three times 
when seeking to replace Viktor Chernomyrdin. Led primarily by the CPRF, many 
members of the Duma argued that the president had to submit three different 
names. (Interfax, 1058 GMT, 11 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-345) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Michael Reardon and LCDR Fred Drummond 
 
Russia's strategic defense reaches the new millennium two years early 
In a year otherwise marked by crises, failures and economic strife, the Russian 
Federation has apparently chalked one up in the win column for 1998 by fielding 
a regiment of Topol-M missiles, what many in Russia have proclaimed as their 
"strategic jewel for the 21st century." On 27 December, Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeev attended the inauguration of the first Russian regiment of Topol-M 
single warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (designated by NATO as SS-
27). (Interfax, 0901 GMT, 27 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-361) Speaking at a 
ceremonial inspection of the Taman Strategic Missile Division at Tatishchevo 
missile base in the Saratov region, Sergeev commented on the modernization 
program by saying, "We faced the need to revive all rocket construction 
technologies." A nation must make its strategic weapons "with its own hands, 
and Russia has accomplished this task." (Interfax, 1616 GMT, 27 Dec 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-361) He went on to say that "adoption of Topol-M ... would preserve 
Russia's security and independence by keeping its missile and nuclear potential 
intact [for the] foreseeable future." 
 
Announcement of the regiment's entry into active service follows the successful 
test launch of a Topol-M ICBM from the Plesetsk launch site on 9 December. 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 0822 GMT, 9 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-343) 
Commenting after the launch, Vladimir Yakovlev, CINC Strategic Missile Troops 
(SMT), stated that "the task of developing and introducing Topol-M missiles in the 
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SMT, which was set by the supreme commander [Yel'tsin] and the Defense 
Minister [Igor Sergeev]," has been successfully carried out. Then, predicting what 
many high officials have been touting for some time and what would prove true 
later in the month, he said that the first stage of the new missile complex would 
be ready in 1998. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0822 GMT, 9 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-343) 
 
The press service of the SMT told ITAR-TASS that the 9 December launch was 
the sixth test launch of the missile. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0822 GMT, 9 
Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-343) Later in December, Interfax reported that the Topol-
M "has passed six test launches." (Interfax, 1616 GMT, 27 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-361) These statistics further cloud the missile's testing phase, since an 
October 1998 test launch ended in failure. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 16) 
Notwithstanding, Sergeev told reporters, "The main testing operations for the 
Topol-M are now over but there still remain four tests to do." (Interfax, 1616 
GMT, 27 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-361) 
 
Coincidentally, the activation of the missile regiment comes on the heels of the 
US-British bombing of Iraqi targets and in time for the endgame of the 1999 
budget discussions. With its conventional forces decaying rapidly, it appears 
some Russians are using the first regiment of Topol-Ms as a means to tell the 
West they still have considerable military muscle available. Additionally, Deputy 
Premier Maslyukov is using the Topol-M success to push for ratification of the 
START-II treaty by showing Duma members that there is a solid, working plan to 
replace the aging strategic force and to lobby for increased defense spending to 
accomplish his lofty goal of 10 more of these Topol-Ms in 1999 and upwards of 
40 annually thereafter. 
 
Kosmos-3M rocket narrowly misses Santa Claus 
December 1998 was a successful month for Russian Strategic Missile Troops 
(SMT). On 10 December, they successfully launched a Kosmos carrier rocket 
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from the Plesetsk space site. This rocket put two satellites in orbit -- the Russian 
Nadezhda rescue apparatus and the Swedish Astrid-2 scientific satellite. The 
Nadezhda space apparatus is to become part of the Kospas-Sarsat system 
which will be used to search for vessels and aircraft. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 
1209 GMT, 10 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-344) 
 
[Later in the month, the SMT narrowly escaped having a second successful 
rocket launch marred by a mid-air collision with an airborne sleigh. Shortly after 
2300 on 24 December, a Kosmos-3M rocket launched by Strategic Missile 
Troops from the Plesetsk northern state testing cosmodrome apparently came 
within three meters of a sub-sonic, reindeer powered aircraft which was manned 
by a single pilot. Sources who asked to remain anonymous stated the aircraft 
escaped with no mechanical difficulties and only slight burn damage to some of 
the cargo. The pilot could not be reached for comment.] 
 
The Kosmos-3M rocket released a Kosmos-2361 artificial satellite into orbit. The 
satellite is intended for use in the interest of the Russian defense ministry. (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 0720 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359) This particular 
launch proved doubly beneficial for strategic forces as it was promptly spotted via 
electronic means by the Space Missile Defense (SMD) forces. According to a 
source within the Russian defense ministry, the carrier rocket was tracked 
dependably after its start was spotted, and the information about it was 
transmitted to the central command post of the strategic missile forces. (ITAR-
TASS, 2246 GMT, 24 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-358) 
 
The task of the SMD forces is to spot launchings of ballistic missiles, to 
determine the beginning of an enemy missile attack, and to inform top state 
government officials and the military command. They ensure the retaliatory and 
counter-retaliatory actions of the nuclear forces. It is the duty of the SMD units to 
reconnoiter and control the outer space, to furnish warnings about the flights of 
foreign reconnaissance and other space systems. (ITAR-TASS, 2246 GMT, 24 
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Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-358) The final success occurred on 30 December, this 
time from the Baykonur cosmodrome. At 2135, a Proton booster rocket 
successfully carried three satellites of the Glonass system into space. (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 1936 GMT, 30 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-364) 
 
The timing of these launches was very opportune as Rosvooruzhenie (Russia's 
major arms exporting company), the Russian Security Council, the Russian 
Strategic Missile Troops, and major players in the Russian aerospace sector all 
participated in hosting the "Second International Conference on Russian Light 
and Medium-Class Booster Rockets in Space Projects of the 21st Century." This 
conference, primarily designed to promote Russian space launch services to 
foreign customers, conducted its last day of business out at the Plesetsk 
cosmodrome, observing the 10 December launch mentioned above. (ITAR-
TASS, 1445 GMT, 8 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-342) Yuri Khozyainov, 
Rosvooruzhenie's first deputy general director, has set up a space and special 
projects department to handle exports of products and services in the fields of 
space programs, cartography, information technologies, and double-purpose 
services. (ITAR-TASS, 1445 GMT, 8 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-342) Khozyainov 
also stated that his company was in consultations with the Russian Space 
Agency to determine appropriate separation in their areas of responsibility for 
delivering space services to foreign customers. 
 
Cyprus keeps tourists -- sends missiles to Crete 
In January 1997, Cyprus and Russia signed an arms deal in excess of US$500 
million to ship S-300 air defense systems to Cyprus. The terms of the contract 
included an 18-month delivery window. This controversial deal raised eyebrows 
in several countries, for a multitude of reasons. The most vocal country was 
Turkey, Cyprus' primary reason for procurement of the systems in the first place. 
Throughout 1997 and 1998, Turkey threatened to take any measures necessary 
to stop delivery of the systems, including the use of force. Russia countered 
Turkish threats with continued commitment to deliver the systems. After several 
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delays, the Greek Cypriot government announced in September 1998 that 
delivery of the air defense systems would be again postponed until autumn, 
possibly November, rather than chancing any repercussions in the summer when 
the tourist season is at its peak in Cyprus. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 12) 
 
Well, it appears now as if those tourists have taken up squatters' rights and don't 
plan on leaving anytime soon. On 29 December, Glavkos Kliridhis, president of 
the Republic of Cyprus, announced that he had returned from a lengthy meeting 
with Greek government officials and decided that the Russian-made S-300s 
would be deployed to Crete instead of Cyprus. (CyBC Television Network, 1846 
GMT, 29 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-363) Besides the tourists, this change produces 
some interesting political impacts/questions for those involved and can be 
explored from various angles. 
 
Will the decision enhance Cyprus' chances for accelerated admission into the 
European Union? Will the US "pay back" Cyprus for its cooperation with added 
pressure on Turkey to end a quarter-century of military occupation of Cyprus? 
Will Greece's stature in Europe be raised for its participation in Kliridhis' 
decision? Will Turkey's role in the region increase now that it has successfully 
derailed the arms deal, at least to Cyprus? Is/was the US more concerned about 
stability in the area or prevention of Russia's further expansion into the arms 
market in the Eastern Mediterranean area? 
 
Each could form the basis for its own editorial, however, views from Moscow are 
more pertinent for this discussion. Since penning this deal 24 months ago, 
Moscow has been steadfast in its commitment to fulfill the terms of the contract. 
Even after news of Kliridhis' decision reached Moscow, the Russian foreign 
ministry announced that it expected the Greek Cypriot side to respect the main 
provisions of the contract on the purchase of the S-300 missiles and that any 
changes should be discussed with Russia first. (Anatolia, 1051 GMT, 30 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-364) However, there are signs that Russia may be warming up to 
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what appears to be the inevitable. On 7 January, Russia's ambassador to Cyprus 
said that Nicosia's recent decision not to deploy Russian S-300 air defense 
missile complexes on the island would in no way harm relations between Russia 
and Cyprus. Ambassador Georgy Muradov's remarks followed a meeting with 
Cypriot President Kliridhis. The two sides reportedly also discussed the costs of 
storing the S-300 missiles in Russia, as well as possible complications in 
shipping the complexes to the Greek island of Crete rather than to Cyprus. In 
view of Russia's friendly relations with both Greece and Cyprus, however, 
Muradov suggested that any difficulties in that area should be easily overcome. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 8 Jan 99) 
 
The Russian arms sales industry may receive some short-term benefits for its S-
300 troubles. Since the S-300s cannot provide the same anti-air umbrella for 
Cyprus against a Turkish opponent from their newly designated location on 
Crete, Cyprus may be in the market for a much smaller defense weapon in the 
Russian-made TOR-M1 missile. The TOR-M1 missile has a much smaller range 
(12km vs. 200 km) than the S-300 and, therefore, cannot intercept incoming 
Turkish aircraft in Turkish airspace. However, it does have the advantages of 
increased flexibility and rapid firing capability. (I Simerini, 1354 GMT, 4 Jan 99; 
FBIS-WEU-99-004) Any firm TOR-M1 deal is still in the discussion phase, and far 
from concrete reality at this point. I'm sure the tourists in Cyprus would have to 
be consulted first to verify they would rather have the smaller missile screaming 
over their vacation spots. 
 
A final point on the redeployment to Crete is that, though the missiles have 
apparently been ready for shipment from Russia since 15 December (I Simerini, 
1354 GMT, 4 Jan 99; FBIS-WEU-99-004), there is substantial infrastructure 
which must be put in place prior to making the systems combat-ready. This 
infrastructure, which has been completed on Cyprus, will have to be replicated on 
Crete at a cost of many millions of dollars and a 6- to 12-month construction 
delay. (Alithia, 1605 GMT, 29 Dec 98; FBIS-WEU-98-363) During this period, 
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whether the missiles remain in Russia or are delivered to Crete, they will not be 
able to be placed in "combat-ready" status. Of course, learning from the past, the 
first step on Crete will be to accomplish a market survey to determine if the 
tourists agree with basing the missiles there. 
 
Money from nothing, and my troops for free 
Russia rang in the new year with the confirmation that the total number of 
personnel serving in its armed forces is now down to 1.2 million. (Interfax, 0853 
GMT, 28 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-362) The same press release stated that the 
armed forces now are comprised of "four arms" instead of the previous five. 
President Boris Yel'tsin was quoted as saying that this change makes it easier to 
"control the Armed Forces," which is certainly an interesting comment. One of the 
prime motives for the downsizing and reorganization is monetary, of course. 
There simply isn't money available to pay over a million service members 
reliably, maintain existing infrastructures, and still harbor desires for new and 
upgraded weapons systems. 
 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, in a speech to the State Duma in mid-December, 
described the troop reduction as part of the overall reform of Russia's military. 
Approximately 133,000 officers and warrant officers were to be released from 
duty, but unfortunately not all were expected to be "fully paid because of the lack 
of finances." Despite that last point, Tass reported, Sergeev noted that the 
government was planning to "raise salaries of servicemen by 1.6 times on 
January 1, 1999, and double rank payments on July 1, 1999." (ITAR-TASS, 1856 
GMT, 11 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-345) The proposed pay increases were repeated 
in various subsequent press releases, including the release of Yel'tsin's decree 
on the pay raises on Christmas Day. (ITAR-TASS, 1350 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-360) Other beneficiaries of the decree are internal affairs staff, penal 
system employees, customs and federal tax police personnel. 
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While this sounds like a great Christmas present, outside observers must ask the 
question (once again): "Where is the money coming from?" After all, one of the 
recurring stories from 1998 was the monthly drama of promises, 
pronouncements, and complaints concerning paying current and back wages to 
servicemen and other government employees. We don't expect that the refrain of 
this tune will change any time soon. 
 
One statement made by Sergeev in his Duma speech that was omitted by Tass, 
but reported by Interfax, was that the defense ministry received only half of its 
earmarked funds for the year. Sergeev singled out food rations as being 
underfunded, but assured the Duma that the "[s]ervicemen are receiving their 
three meals a day." (Interfax, 1547 GMT, 11 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-345) Perhaps 
Sergeev made this comment in response to a statement made by a State Duma 
deputy to the press on 9 December. The Tass report's leading sentence charged 
that the "Russian Armed Forces have plunged to the lowest possible level of 
nutrition," and the official was quoted as saying it was a "gruesome situation." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1426 GMT, 9 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-343) 
 
Not surprisingly, others in Russia are not happy with the direction taken in the 
armed forces downsizing efforts. Back in the beginning of December, Tass 
reported on comments made by a colonel who was described as "an expert on 
the Russian State Duma Committee for Security." The colonel criticized the low 
level of projected defense funding in the new year's defense budget. He argued 
for an increase of the stated 2.6 percent of GDP for defense to 3.5 percent, and 
even then that would only ensure adequate subsistence for military personnel. 
The colonel stated that "the President has instructed that funds totalling 3.5 
percent of GDP should be set aside for defense needs every year." (ITAR-TASS, 
1122 GMT, 4 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-338) We'll see what the Duma ends up 
saying. A month later the Russian Air Force commander in chief echoed similar 
complaints. Actually, the CINC was more blunt, and stated that air force 
capability is diminished, including the ability of the Russians to counter such 
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threats as carrier battle groups. (Radio Rossii Network, 1800 GMT, 3 Jan 99; 
FBIS-SOV-99-003) 
 
There are some interesting things going on here. Taken together, the press 
reports from December paint a multi-layered picture. At the top are the 
downsizing and reorganization efforts, necessary in large part due to the 
federation's economic crisis. Then there are the reports from military and civilian 
authorities acknowledging that military personnel are surviving, but conditions are 
still bad. Note the two-way dialogue going on here. Sergeev gives essentially a 
status report: The troops are being fed, and oh by the way we need some more 
money. Then come the countering statements that in essence say: The troops 
aren't dying of malnutrition, yet, and by the way, we need to spend more on the 
military. This then leads to the justification for the promised pay increases, with 
the by now increasingly unnecessary reminder that a fed and paid army is a 
happy army. 
 
At the bottom there are the occasional reminders of external threats (i.e., more 
justification for money), and perhaps a reminder to the Russian people of the 
importance of the armed forces in a time of austerity and no real foreign military 
threat. Comments such as those made by the Air Force commander in chief, 
alluding to the United States as a (continued) potential threat to the homeland, 
are entertaining from our viewpoint, but certainly serve domestic political 
purposes. The question on that last point is: To what degree do Russian officials 
believe their own rhetoric on outside threats? Old mindsets are hard, and slow, to 
change. 
 
But don't downsize my job 
Given all the talk about reducing the number of personnel in the armed forces, 
Komsomol'skaya pravda editorialized on Yel'tsin appointing almost 100 new 
general officers. Back in 1997 Yel'tsin "fulminated" about the number of general 
officers on the books, then totaling around 1700. The figure was decreased to 
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1500, with more projected cuts promised by the defense ministry. Recently an 
edict was signed by the president promoting almost 100 Army officers to the rank 
of general, however, prompting the newspaper to speculate that the reason was 
to bolster Yel'tsin's power base. In that vein the newspaper also cited the 
appointing of a "career general" to head the presidential staff as "very revealing." 
(Komsomol'skaya pravda, 16 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-350) It's always useful to 
have the heads of your armed forces friendly and on your side when you're 
running a country. Oh yes; make sure to promise pay increases, too. 
 
Yel'tsin also recently signed another edict concerning senior officers. One of the 
particular provisions allows the extension of active duty for those who have 
reached the maximum retirement age. Contracts will allow one-, three-, or five-
year extensions, with a total limit of ten years duration. Defense Minister Sergeev 
is just one of the senior officials who can now stay beyond the previous limit. In 
its report, Komsomol'skaya pravda reminded readers that under the USSR 
system, defense ministers stayed until they could no longer physically hack it. 
This may not be a problem with Sergeev, the paper suggests, because of the 
hostility directed at him by the "top generals" for some of his reform measures. 
He's not expected to stay in the job when Yel'tsin is no longer in office. 
(Komsomol'skaya pravda, 6 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-006) The main source of 
dissatisfaction with Sergeev centers on his proposal to consolidate all nuclear 
forces into one command and take operational control of those forces away from 
the General Staff. Guess a hundred new friends isn't turning the tide of feelings 
from within the military structure towards the number one man in the defense 
ministry.  
 
Crime and punishment 
Some high-ranking Russian officers have found their own personal way to deal 
with the current monetary-troubled times; unfortunately, some of them have been 
caught. Tass reported on the Main Military Procurator's Office proceeding with 
criminal charges against an unspecified number of generals accused of 
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corruption and bribery. (ITAR-TASS, 1451 GMT, 8 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-342) 
Corruption and bribery amongst flag officers occurred in the USSR (after all, if 
you were a general officer, and you didn't have your own dacha by the time you 
retired, you were obviously not taking appropriate advantage of your position in 
service of the people's defense), and it was only to be expected that such 
practices would continue in the Russian Federation. What is different now is that 
some of the officers are actually being prosecuted. Every once in awhile there 
are examples of the rule of law in the empire. 
 
Rossiyskaya gazeta reported on an "unusual" military anticorruption unit in the 
North Caucasus. Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Tolmachev, who previously 
risked his career by giving the newspaper accounts of military wrongdoing, was 
named to head the special unit. Tolmachev contributed articles that told of 
various generals profiting from their positions; now he gets to oversee the pursuit 
of legal actions against such malefactors. Rossiyskaya gazeta characterized 
these criminal characters in uniform as "highhanded generals, who confuse the 
state's pockets with their own ...." (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
342) 
 
Justice seems to be working within the military in other instances. On the 80th 
anniversary of the military justice system, according to Tass, the head of the 
military courts system stated that "[o]ver 20,000 officers and senior NCO's went 
to court last year." At first reading this looks really bad; is crime that rampant 
within the military? The answer is no, in this case. Here service members are 
availing themselves of the military judicial system to right injustices suffered by 
them. The reasons varied, but centered on living conditions and abuse of power 
and position by senior officials. "Military courts handed down over 40,000 verdicts 
in the first 10 months of this year ... and a similar number of cases were resolved 
before reaching court." This is noteworthy from two aspects. First, there is a 
system for military justice in place, and apparently working to some degree 
Second, the number of cases going before the courts points out the difficulties 
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facing Russia's military personnel today. (ITAR-TASS, 0629 GMT, 8 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-342) 
 
Hot times under the old town tonight 
Many of us have this problem these days: Just what should we do with many of 
the left-over relics from the Cold War? Enterprising Americans have bought 
abandoned ICBM silos and converted them to large, if viewless, underground 
homes. In Sevastopol, two answers are a swimming pool and a nightclub. NTV 
reported on the formerly secret underground town Sevastopol-2, which was a 
vast tunnel-connected construction right under the town proper, built in case of 
nuclear war. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the whole system has fallen 
into disrepair, with little security to prevent plunder. Sevastopol city authorities 
now are in charge of the underground doppelganger and are looking to make 
some money from what remains. Already one bomb shelter has been turned into 
a nightclub, with former submarine channels being considered for a swimming 
pool or aquatic park. Maybe we can consider this the 21st-century version of 
turning swords into plowshares. (NTV, 0900 GMT, 19 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
353)  
 
Of ships and missiles 
There has been talk for quite awhile that the Russian aircraft carrier the Admiral 
Gorshkov would be sold to India. That still hasn't happened, but it appears likely. 
Recently Tass mentioned the ship in an article describing a potent weapon 
system that is "expected" to arm the vessel. (ITAR-TASS, 0933 GMT, 21 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-355) The weapon is the Yakhont, a surface-to-surface anti-ship 
missile with an advertised range of up to 300km. The Mach 2 plus missile can fly 
a variety of profiles, but all end up with the missile homing in on its intended 
target just meters above sea level. This makes it extremely difficult for self-
defense weapons systems to find, engage, and destroy the Yakhont before the 
missile hits the intended ship. The Russians are quite proud of the Yakhont, as 
the Tass press release makes clear. 
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As to the Admiral Gorshkov, no further details were given regarding the status of 
the hoped-for sale; the issue is to "be decided at Russian-Indian inter-
governmental talks." The Admiral Gorshkov is the fourth and last of the Soviet 
Union's Kiev-class aircraft carriers. These ships were designed with conventional 
cruiser bows and angled flight decks for short take-off and vertical landing 
(STOVL) aircraft and helicopters. The ship has been redesigned with a full carrier 
deck, incorporating a "ski-ramp" bow to launch conventional fixed-wing aircraft. 
 
Spies among us 
It's not just high-ranking military officers and members of the Duma who are 
worried about external threats to Russia. A couple of news releases in December 
reported on spying by unnamed western services. Tass quoted the military 
intelligence chief of the Leningrad military district who spoke of intelligence 
gathering efforts by NATO and Baltic country agents. The closing quote from the 
good general is telling and worth repeating here : "We are aware of all the 
aspects of these activities, from espionage to exploring the opportunities offered 
by the increased freedom of the press." (ITAR-TASS, 1256 GMT, 19 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-353) We'd like to see the general's definition of spying, and isn't 
freedom of the press a burdensome thing with which to deal? 
 
Interfax wrote a short article on a television address given by the director of the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), Vladimir Putin. Putin warned of crime, 
corruption, terrorist acts, and other "internal and external threats to Russia's 
security." (Interfax, 0800 GMT, 20 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-354) Western "special 
services" were mentioned as trying to obtain information on weapons 
developments and combat readiness, particularly Russia's "nuclear deterrence 
component." That sounds pretty much on the spot -- most of us outside Russia 
would like to know more on these topics. Unstated is the same topic just 
mentioned: What constitutes spying, and what constitutes legitimate (and legal) 
fact finding? What Mr. Putin and his cohorts may not recognize are the quite real 
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concerns worldwide over questions on the status of the former USSR's nuclear 
arsenal: who's in charge of all the systems; is the technology being sold, and if 
so, to whom; is all the nuclear material accounted for; and that's just for starters. 
Also, the effects of nuclear contamination from the Russian fleet are of more than 
passing interest to neighbors such as Norway. So yes, Mr. Putin, you are 
probably correct in your assessment of western powers gathering information 
within your country. Welcome to the new world order. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
CIS collective security lacks collective funds 
As the CIS Collective Security Treaty nears the end of its first five years, Russian 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev has begun a vigorous campaign to extend its 
lifespan. (ITAR-TASS, 1327 GMT, 2 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-336) Sergeev also 
has called for further defense cooperation, specifically the implementation of a 
military cooperation program until 2001 and the appointment of a new 
peacekeeping commander in Abkhazia. (Interfax, 0908 GMT, 21 Dec 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-356) However, CIS military cooperation is thwarted by a severe lack of 
funding. A meeting of the CIS Council of Ministers of Defense revealed that the 
CIS member states owe more than 34 billion rubles (R) for 1994-98. In past 
years, Russia has made up the difference, but this year has only been able to 
contribute R6.4 billion toward the R12.25 billion shortfall. (ITAR-TASS, 1046 
GMT, 21 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-355) 
 
We're just keeping an eye on our own backyard! 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov recently denied Russia's hegemonic 
interests in the conflicts of CIS member states, saying that the resolution of 
conflicts "conforms to Russia's strategic interests." The comment specifically 
addressed Azerbaijan's concerns about Russian arms sales to Armenia. Ivanov 
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further responded that while Nagorno-Karabakh is a complicated situation, 
"[Russia] is ready to provide comprehensive assistance," and that relations with 
Armenia "should continue developing." (Interfax, 1435 GMT, 28 Dec 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-362) However, a recent CIS Council of the Border Troops Commanders 
indicated that Russia's desire to secure its strategic interests within the former 
borders remains. Despite Georgia's attempt to force a vote "on manifestations of 
separatism as a development that destroys the territorial integrity of the state and 
the unity of its state border...," the issue was not adopted by the council. To the 
contrary, the director of the Russian Border Guard Service acerbically replied, 
"unlike my Georgian counterpart, I believe that there are internal and external 
borders in the CIS and that they should be treated in a different way." The 
Georgian government is most concerned with Russia's self-proclaimed "outward 
haulage of agricultural products...from and the import of a certain quantity of food 
to Abkhazia." (ITAR-TASS, 1631 GMT, 3 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-338) 
 
Money, money, money 
The IMF and World Bank announced that they would provide $200 million in 
financial aid to CIS countries affected by the recent crisis in Russia. The money 
has been specifically earmarked for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova and Tajikistan since "the crisis in Russia threatens an upset in economic 
stability in these countries." (Interfax, 0818 GMT, 24 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-358) 
 
Free trade progresses 
The draft protocol on changing and enlarging the 15 April 1994 agreement on the 
creation of a free trade zone was finalized and approved at a December meeting 
of the working group of the CIS Interstate Economic Committee. The draft, which 
was accepted by delegates from each CIS state, has been submitted for 
approval to all member states. Following approval, a finalized version will be 
submitted to the Council of CIS Heads of State. The draft protocol was 
accompanied by a Ukrainian request to insert an article that excludes indirect 
taxation of goods and services exported between free trade areas. Although this 
 26 
initiative was supported by all but Russia, the Russian proposal to include the 
issue of indirect taxes in a separate agreement was ultimately accepted. 
(Interfax, 1705 GMT, 30 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-364) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Stress and strain in relations with Iran 
The Azerbaijani legislature, the Milli Majles, approved three accords with Iran in 
early December. The agreements pertain to the extradition of criminals, the 
transfer of prisoners, and collaboration in the legal and judicial sphere. According 
to estimates, roughly 100 Iranians are held prisoner in Azerbaijan. (IRNA, 2226 
GMT, 3 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-337) Several Azeri opposition parties condemned 
the treaties' ratification on the grounds that they would be used to extradite ethnic 
Azeri dissidents who had fled from Iran. Their fears proved well-grounded when, 
in early January, Iran requested the extradition of Mohammedali Galibi, an 
Iranian citizen who led the National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 
(located in Northern Iran) until he immigrated to Azerbaijan in 1997. Galibi is 
resisting the extradition and claiming that he would be executed in Iran. (Turan, 
1630 GMT, 5 Jan 99; FBIS-SOV-99-006) 
 
Caspian Sea demarcation still incomplete 
In 1998 several meetings were held between Azeri and Turkmen experts to 
define the extent of each state's Caspian Sea sector with respect to the other 
state. Although by participating in the negotiations Turkmenistan endorses the 
principal of sectoral division of the sea, the difficulty of defining the precise 
boundary has proven quite formidable. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan both claim 
the Kyapaz, Azeri and Chirag deposits. The last series of negotiations ended in 
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early December without any resolution. (Turan, 1000 GMT, 9 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-344) 
 
The lack of clear demarcation provided fertile ground for a similar disagreement 
with Iran. The Azerbaijani foreign ministry has protested against prospective 
geophysical studies to be carried out by Iran and the oil companies Shell and 
Lazno in what Azerbaijan regards as its sector of the Caspian Sea. (Interfax, 
1557 GMT, 10 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-344) 
 
Azeris protest Russian military aid to Armenia 
Russian deliveries of military aid have only intensified since the scandal in early 
1997 when it was revealed that Russia has transferred weapons worth more than 
$1 billion to Armenia since 1994. In the last two years Armenia took possession 
of zenith missile complexes (including the S-300 missiles), five MiG-29 fighter 
planes, and many other weapons. 
 
This information was revealed by Azerbaijani State Foreign Policy Adviser Vafa 
Guluzade, who sees the Russian arming of Armenia as an element of the 
former's imperial and anti-Turk policy which manifested itself in Russian support 
for the Armenian side in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Guluzade described an 
OSCE-sponsored meeting in 1993 where the Armenian representative told 
participants that the Armenians only meant to occupy Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
Russians came up with the idea of occupying the additional areas adjacent to the 
disputed region. Shortly after this meeting, Guluzade was summoned to Moscow 
by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoli Adamishin who tried to convince him 
to allow a Russian military presence in the adjacent Armenian-occupied area 
called Kelbadzhar. (Zerkalo, 26 Dec 98, pp. 10, 11; FBIS-SOV-98-364) 
 
The Azerbaijani defense minister, Safar Abiev, complained to Turkey's 
representatives about the Russian military transfers to Armenia and called on 
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Turkey to expand its military support of Azerbaijan. (Turan, 1200 GMT, 29 Dec 
98; FBIS-SOV-362) 
 
GEORGIA 
Trading border guards for bases? 
Since early last fall Georgia has been reclaiming control over sections of its 
border. The coastal checkpoints have already been transferred from Russia to 
Georgia and the land portion of the frontier is due to follow by July 1999. (See 
interview with President Eduard Shevardnadze, Radio Tbilisi Network, 0600 
GMT, 21 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-355) This important achievement may have 
come at a very high cost. As Liz Fuller surmises, Russia's willingness to return 
control over the border to the Georgians may be in return for a promise to 
abandon efforts to evict the Russian bases from Georgia. "During talks with 
senior Russian officials in Moscow later in November, Georgian Minister of State 
Vazha Lortkipanidze reportedly agreed that the Russian military bases in Georgia 
should not be closed ... as they constitute a 'stabilizing factor' in the Caucasus." 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 8 Jan 99) 
 
Georgian Communists celebrate Stalin's anniversary 
Roughly a thousand people gathered to commemorate the 119th anniversary of 
Joseph Stalin's birth in the village of Gori. Panteleimon Georgadze, the leader of 
the Georgian Communist Party, addressed the gathering and lamented that 
"Stalin's cause has been betrayed" and that no leader capable of reuniting the 
Soviet Union has emerged. (Interfax, 1336 GMT, 21 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-355) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Campaign violations cited by OSCE and two presidential candidates 
 29 
After expressing its disapproval of the Kazakh parliament's decision to hold early 
presidential elections in January 1999, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decided to send only a 15-member observer 
team to assess the election process, instead of an actual monitoring team, which 
would require at least 200 personnel. According to Judy Thompson, coordinator 
of the Kazakh mission of the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights, reliable reports of the use of coercion to obtain voter signatures 
during the registration period for presidential candidates, the fact that two 
candidates were barred from running at all, and the extreme brevity of the 
campaign period itself caused the OSCE to harbor grave doubts about the 
fairness of the entire election process. (Interfax, 1409 GMT, 24 Dec 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-358) 
 
Two of the four presidential candidates -- Gani Kasymov (chairman of 
Kazakhstan's Customs Committee) and Serikbolsyn Abildin (the Kazakh 
Communist Party candidate) -- have also publicly complained about authorities' 
interference in their election campaigns. Both candidates cited local officials' 
refusal to provide them with facilities to meet with their supporters, and Kasymov 
also mentioned that his posters and leaflets had been torn down, and that the 
press would not publish his election program. (Interfax, 1041 GMT, 25 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-359, and Interfax, 1645 GMT, 23 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-) 
 
Kazakhstan planning to build its own fleet of oil tankers 
The Kazakh government plans to construct its own fleet of oil tankers to carry 
petroleum from its Caspian wells to the world market via the Volga River, the 
Volga-Don Channel, the Black Sea, the Bosporus Straits, and the Mediterranean 
Sea. Some ships will be purchased from abroad and some will be built at 
Kazakhstan's Zenith defense plant in Ural'sk, near the Russian border. The 
government plans to allocate US$94 million for the establishment of the oil tanker 
fleet. (Interfax, 1727 GMT, 26 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-360) 
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KYRGYZSTAN 
New government installed by President Akaev 
On 23 December, President Akaev submitted a proposal to the Security Council 
that Prime Minister Jumaliev's government should be dismissed, based on the 
fact that the present government had not taken effective steps to resolve 
Kyrgyzstan's financial crisis. The prime minister and the National Bank chairman, 
Marat Sultanov, were also in attendance at the Security Council meeting, where 
they had presented a report on the country's economy. President Akaev rebuked 
both of them for not working together to coordinate a program for the alleviation 
of Kyrgyzstan's economic problems and blamed their inaction for the som's 
drastic fall in value. The vote in support of President Akaev's proposal was 
unanimous, with one abstention. (Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network, 1000 
GMT, 23 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-360) 
 
President Akaev signed a decree appointing Jumabek Ibraimov to the post of 
prime minister two days after the Security Council meeting; the parliament 
approved his appointment the same day. (Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network, 
1400 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359, and ITAR-TASS World Service, 1035 
GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359) The new prime minister had been chairman 
of the Property Fund since 1997, and prior to that he held a number of different 
posts, including those of: presidential administration chief, presidential adviser, 
and the president's representative in parliament. Ibraimov also served as the 
chief of the Bishkek city administration and as the director of a Bishkek 
automobile assembly plant, prior to entering the president's service. (Interfax, 
1333 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359) 
 
Shortly after Ibraimov's appointment as Kyrgyzstan's new prime minister, the 
presidential press secretary, Kanybek Imanaliev, announced that President 
Akaev was in the process of drafting a decree which would bestow greater 
authority upon the prime minister, in order to enhance his ability to resolve the 
country's economic crisis. These additional powers will most likely include the 
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right to appoint regional, city and district administration chiefs, as well as the right 
to appoint and dismiss ministers and department chairmen. Previously, only the 
president could order these officials' appointments and dismissals. (Interfax, 
1042 GMT, 28 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-362) 
 
Comment 
Whatever the reasons were for Kanybek Jumaliev's dismissal, it would seem that 
he did not consult President Akaev as much as the latter would have liked. 
Ibraimov, on the other hand, has already pledged that should he encounter any 
obstacles to his plans for Kyrgyzstan's economic recovery, he will request both 
presidential and parliamentary assistance. It is not clear whether this promise 
was meant as an assurance to the president or as a threat to his opponents -- 
perhaps it should be considered as both. 
 
Anti-corruption campaign to rescue the economy and reduce crime? 
In the weeks preceding the prime minister's dismissal, an anti-corruption 
campaign launched by President Akaev's administration felled a number of high-
ranking government officials. The president accepted the resignation of his 
administration chief, Omar Sultanov, on 9 December, presumably for engaging in 
"intrigues and politicking." (Kabar, 0910 GMT, 10 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-344) A 
few days later, police arrested the deputy ministers of finance, industry, and 
ecology, as well as the chiefs of various branches of the agriculture and finance 
ministries. The arrested officials were charged with counts of corruption and 
abuse of office. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0956 GMT, 14 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-348) 
 
According to Kyrgyzstan's Prosecutor General Asanbek Shirshenaliev, 383 
government officials have lost their posts since 1993 due to corruption 
allegations against them. He stated that the latest wave of arrests was the 
culmination of a year-long investigation. He also announced that the newly 
created Coordinating Council Against Corruption and Economic Crime, which 
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was established by President Akaev on 19 December, had begun setting up 
telephone hotlines to receive Kyrgyz citizens' complaints about corrupt officials. 
(Interfax, 1348 GMT, 21 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-355) 
 
Prime Minister Ibraimov has pledged to make the fight against corruption one of 
his government's primary objectives, in concomitance with ending Kyrgyzstan's 
current economic crisis. In fact, he hopes to resolve the country's financial 
problems at least partially by cracking down on such crimes as smuggling and 
tax evasion and by abolishing some of the privileges which many government 
officials enjoy. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1304 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-359) During his first news conference as Kyrgyzstan's prime minister, Mr. 
Ibraimov also announced that he intended to work to make the government's 
dealings more "transparent," including the possible open publication of how much 
tax revenue is collected, from whom the taxes are collected, and what the tax 
money is used for. (Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network, 1400 GMT, 25 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-360) 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
UTO commanders battle in downtown Dushanbe 
Two United Tajik Opposition (UTO) commanders who had been called to 
Dushanbe for a conference with the opposition's top leadership became involved 
in an hour-long firefight on 30 December in the city's center. A group of Field 
Commander Ali Pirmuhammadov's supporters ambushed a number of Field 
Commander Rahmon Sanginov's men with fire from automatic weapons and 
grenade launchers as the latter exited the offices of the National Reconciliation 
Commission. A violent altercation on the outskirts of Dushanbe several days 
beforehand, during which two of Sanginov's supporters were killed, is thought to 
be the cause of the incident in Dushanbe. Police sealed off the area surrounding 
the shootout, but otherwise did not attempt to interfere. Two opposition members 
were killed and three civilians were injured during the brief battle (Voice of the 
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Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 25 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-359, and ITAR-
TASS, 0931 GMT, 30 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-364). 
 
On 31 December the UTO leadership released a statement announcing that 
Rahmon Sanginov and Ali Pirmuhammadov had been relieved of their 
commands by order of UTO chairman Said Abdullo Nuri, and that their 
supporters should surrender their arms immediately, or face criminal 
proceedings. Those who voluntarily gave up their weapons would be amnestied. 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 1045 GMT, 31 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-365) 
 
Comment 
Rahmon Sanginov has been a thorn in the side of the UTO leadership for over a 
year now, often refusing to obey the orders of the top command, and using his 
forces to rob and terrorize local civilians. He and his supporters have also 
clashed with other UTO field commanders more than once, as well as attacking 
government armed forces and police. Sanginov has proven to be a renegade 
commander, whose principal concern appears to be self-aggrandizement; 
unfortunately, there are a number of others much like him. Until the UTO leaders 
find a way of neutralizing these commanders and ensuring that all of their 
supporters obey orders handed down from the top, it is unlikely that President 
Rahmonov's administration will be much inclined to fulfill all the terms of the 
peace agreement's political protocol. 
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